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Going Positive: The effects of negative and positive advertising on candidate success and 
voter turnout 
Liam C. Malloy and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz 
Abstract 
Given the depth of research on negative advertising in campaigns, scholars have wondered why 
candidates continue to go negative. We build on this research by considering real world 
campaign contexts in which candidates are working in competition with each other and have to 
react to the decisions of the opposing campaign. Our results suggest that it is never efficacious 
for candidates to run negative ads, but running positive ads can increase a candidate’s margin of 
victory. These results are conditioned by two factors: candidates must both stay positive and out-
advertise their opponent. Second, the effects of positive advertising are strongest in areas where 
the candidate is losing or winning by a large margin and where they might be tempted to not 
advertise.   
Despite the millions of dollars that are spent on campaign advertising each election 
season, scholars studying the effects of campaign advertisements have found mixed evidence of 
the efficacy of these ads (see Lau et al. 2000; 2007 for a meta-analysis of the studies).  To 
summarize the results of over 100 studies on tone in both campaign advertising and elections in 
general, Lau et al. (2007, 1176), conclude that “[a]ll told the research literature does not bear out 
the idea that negative campaigning is an effective means of winning votes, even though it tends 
to be more memorable and stimulate knowledge about the campaign. Nor is there any reliable 
evidence that negative campaigning depresses voter turnout, though it does slightly lower 
feelings of political efficacy, trust in government, and possibly overall public mood.” They find 
similar results in the literature pertaining to positive ads—the results of these studies are 
inconsistent and often null (Lau et al.2007).  
Many researchers wonder why campaigns continue to employ negative ads if they seem 
to have no impact on the election (e.g. Lau and Pomper 2004). One reason, we suggest, is 
because few studies focus on actual campaign dynamics and consider how strategies are 
employed to win elections. 
Candidates and political consultants are not generally concerned within the context of an 
election about topics important to democratic theorists like political efficacy, trust in 
government, and “political mood.”  For a candidate or campaign consultant, if only a handful of 
people vote in the election because everyone else believes their vote does not matter, distrusts the 
government, or is turned off, that is fine as long as their candidate wins the majority of the few 
votes that are cast.  Using this logic, if attack ads drive down turnout, as long as it’s the 
opposition’s supporters who do not show up at the polls, attack advertising is to the candidate’s 
strategic advantage. Thus, the germane question to campaign consultants is “will this type of 
advertising help or hurt my candidate?” This is a question that is not well addressed in the 
majority of the literature. 
The literature also fails to address another important element of campaign strategy in 
regard to campaign advertising. Strategic candidates have to make decisions about how much 
money and time to devote to different geographic areas in addition to the decision about whether 
they should go “positive” or “negative”. As Shaw (2006) notes, there are “blackout” and 
“battleground” states: battleground states are those states that are considered “competitive” and 
so presidential candidates focus their campaigns to “win” these votes. Blackout states are those 
in which one candidate is guaranteed to win and so candidates spend very few campaign 
resources in these areas. While this literature has focused on the strategic decisions of 
presidential campaigns, this is also a choice that candidates must make within states. Media 
markets (DMAs) vary in terms of how competitive they are and senatorial and gubernatorial 
candidates must make a choice: devote money to DMAs in which they are guaranteed to win (or 
lose), or devote more money to media markets which are up for grabs.  
In this study, we take into account the strategic decision making of candidates in whether 
to air positive or negative ads and where to air them. We also build on the literature on 
advertising effects in campaigns that take into account proportionality in advertising (see Stevens 
2009 for a full review). While most studies control for the overall negativity or positivity of a 
campaign, candidates have to decide how to react to the actions of the opposing candidate. 
Specifically, candidates have to consider “if my opponent goes negative, should I do so too?” 
This study takes into account these strategic considerations to investigate three research 
questions: 1) is it strategic to advertise in media markets in which a candidate is likely to win or 
lose by significant margins?; 2) in both competitive and noncompetitive media markets, does the 
tone of the ads used by candidates matter to electoral outcomes?; and 3) when one candidate 
goes negative, how does the tone of the other candidate’s ads affect their vote share?  
Our findings suggest that advertising in general increases a candidate’s vote share only in 
noncompetitive areas and only when a candidate can out-advertise her opponent in these areas, 
suggesting that campaign advertising is like an arms race. However, the effects of out-
advertising the opponent only work if the candidate airs positive ads. Particularly for 
Republicans, the beneficial effects for advertising only appear when the candidate airs 
exclusively positive ads. In regards to voter turnout, our findings indicate that a candidate can 
increase the rate at which her voters go to the polls if she airs positive ads mainly in 
noncompetitive areas. Our findings, in sum, suggest that advertising in competitive areas is 
largely ineffective. Likewise, negative advertising appears to never be effective in either 
increasing a candidate’s margin of victory or driving up turnout for the candidate or driving 
down turnout for the competition.   
Does Advertising Matter? 
Early research on political propaganda downplayed the effects of persuasion campaigns 
which ushered in the idea that political communication of this type had “minimal effects” (e.g. 
Patterson and McClure 1976). Zaller (1992; 1996) explains that the extent to which voters are 
susceptible to media information is contingent upon the campaign context and their level of 
political sophistication. The most informed voters are the least susceptible to persuasive 
messages from elites they do not already support and the least sophisticated voters are the most 
susceptible to campaign messages; however, low sophistication voters are also the least likely to 
see news about the campaign.  Zaller’s work supports the “minimal effects” hypothesis in that 
attentive voters who are exposed to positive or negative ads are likely to simply have their pre-
existing preferences further supported, and it is only those paying the least attention that are 
susceptible to campaign messaging.  
Zaller tests his theory using campaign spending; however, over 90 percent of campaign 
funds are spent purchasing advertising.1 Thus, while the research is fairly conclusive that a well-
run and well-staffed “ground game” of door-to-door canvasing can stimulate voter turnout and 
increase a candidate’s vote share (e.g Green et al 2008), the majority of campaign funds go 
toward media buys (Gerber et al 2011). Yet the scholarship on the relationship between 
campaign advertising and voter turnout and/or voter persuasion have found extremely limited 
effects (e.g. Lau et al. 2000; 2007).  
Lau et al. (2000; 2007) performed a meta-study of over 100 articles on the effect of 
campaign advertising and find that advertising, negative or positive, appears ineffective at 
increasing turnout or persuading voters.  However, the vast majority of these studies utilize 
experiments in which subjects are exposed to hand-picked advertisements in a controlled setting 
that lacks the full set of circumstances of an actual campaign in which voters are exposed to 
some civil advertisements discussing candidate qualifications and policy positions and some 
uncivil attacks on an opponent. Very few studies take into account the proportion of ads seen in 
the electoral environment which simulates the real world where candidates may air both positive 
and negative advertising (e.g. Stevens 2009). A few studies implicitly take into account 
proportionality. For example both Clinton and Lapinski (2004) and Garramone et al. (1990) 
                                                 
1 See http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance 
conducted experiments in which subjects were exposed to either all positive, all negative, or a 
mix of positive and negative advertisements. Some other studies have taken into account 
proportionality explicitly.  Ansolabehere et al.(1999) and Brooks (2006) use newspaper coverage 
in the state to aggregate to a three category variable rating the overall tone of the campaign as 
positive, negative, or mixed.2 Finkel and Geer (1998) utilize survey data and aggregate turnout 
data combined with an assessment of the proportion of positive appeals minus the proportion of 
negative appeals in the ads aired in Presidential elections from 1960-1992 for each candidate and 
then combined to produce an overall continuous variable of “campaign tone.” Djupe and 
Peterson (2002) use the proportion of negative to positive news stories in an investigation of 
Senate primaries. Finally, Geer (2006) and Geer and Lau (2006) employ a measure of the 
number of negative ads minus the number of positive ads at the election-level to produce a 
proportional variable of advertising tone.  
Stevens (2009), in the most comprehensive study of proportionality to date, matches 
ANES respondents to an estimate of the proportion of negative advertisements they were likely 
to see leading up to their ANES interview. However, Stevens, like many the other studies above, 
tests this measure on survey respondents and thus cannot test if it is to a strategic candidate’s 
advantage.  
Given the research to date, candidates have to weigh competing goals in their decision 
about whether to air predominantly positive or negative campaigns. Airing positive ads could 
recruit voters by a) increasing the positive traits associated with the candidate (e.g. Ackerberg 
2001) and increasing the availability of that quality to the voter’s mind (Schwartz et al.1991, 
                                                 
2 Also see Pomper and Lau (2004) who assess campaign tone using statements in newspapers about the candidates 
to assess a proportional measure of negative to positive campaign tone. 
Gabrielcik and Fazio 1984) and b) by leaving the electorate with the sense that the candidate is 
likely to be civil toward opposing views. Negativity in this sense comes with a cost: attack ads 
could “backfire” and turn off voters who might otherwise have voted for the candidate (e.g., 
Allen and Burrell 2002; Brooks and Murov 2012). However, attack ads could also be used to 
persuade voters away from voting for the rival candidate either through persuasion or reducing 
turnout of the other candidate’s supporters taking advantage of the affect heuristic (Slovic et al. 
2007).  
We engage these questions by testing to see which type of ads are more effective at 
increasing a candidate’s vote share. Given the research to date, we hypothesize that relatively 
more positive advertising from a candidate should increase the share of votes for that candidate 
and increase voter turnout (H1). Second, relatively more negative advertising directed at a 
candidate from her opponent should reduce votes for that candidate and decrease the 
candidate’s voter turnout (H2).  However, we also argue that there is a “cancelling out” effect: 
while both negative and positive ads may affect candidate support, when candidates advertise 
equally, neither positive nor negative ads should have any effect at all (H3). 
We also build on the existing studies by considering the fact that there are different 
electoral contexts within state-wide and national elections.  Presidential elections are known for 
focusing explicitly on “battleground states” because the popular vote is not relevant to the 
election’s outcome (Shaw 2007). However, even within states, political parties do not have an 
equal amount of support in every area of the state. Instead, parties have areas in which they are 
strong and areas in which they are weak (Pearson-Merkowitz and McTague 2008) and 
candidates, need to be strategic in how they allocate their resources. They can spend campaign 
resources buying airtime in competitive media markets (DMAs) in which they must battle the 
other candidate for support, or they can divide their money between competitive areas in which 
equal advertisement between candidates may cancel out as in an arms race, and noncompetitive 
areas in which they already are likely to either a) win in a landslide in the hopes of increasing 
their electoral margin by increasing turnout among their “base” or b) lose in a landslide in the 
hopes of gaining some votes and not losing others.  We argue that given candidates can win an 
election through two different avenues—by convincing voters in the middle to vote for them 
over the other candidate or by driving up turnout of their supporters—candidates should be 
mindful of how advertising affects voters in different contexts. To this extent, we offer H4: 
candidates who can out-advertise their competition and stay positive can increase their vote 
share and voter turnout, but only in noncompetitive areas.  
Research Design 
To test our hypotheses, we use data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project (WAP) 
(Goldstein and Freedman 2002b). The WAP measures and categorizes the campaign 
advertisements in Gubernatorial, Senatorial and Presidential elections for the election years, 
1996 (presidential only), 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2008. The data categorize each type of 
advertisement as positive (in support of a particular candidate), negative (against a particular 
candidate), or contrasting (drawing distinctions between the candidates). This last category 
provides a challenge for coding the tone of the ad. Should contrasting advertisements be 
considered positive, negative, or neither? Some scholars include them in negative ads (e.g. 
Goldstein and Freedman 2002a) where as others include them as positive ads (e.g. Jamieson et al 
2000). We follow in the footsteps of Geer (2008) and Geer and Brooks (2007) who think of 
promoting advertisements, which may be policy or character based, as trying to get the voter to 
vote for the candidate based on quality attributes. Contrasting advertisements, on the other hand, 
draw a contrast between the candidates but still focuses on the positive nature of the airing 
candidate, even if airing the opposing candidate’s views in a negative comparison. Negative 
advertisements, are unique in that they attack and try to tear down the opponent.  These are 
designed not to get the voter to vote for the ad’s sponsor, but to not vote for her opponent. 
Moreover, the normative literature on the effects of negativity focuses largely on attack ads—not 
on ads about substantive policy. We attempt to make this distinction by grouping promoting and 
contrasting ads as positive advertisements and attack ads as negative advertisements.3 
The data also provides the total number of times each advertisement was aired in each of 
the top Designated Market Areas (DMAs) as defined by Neilson Research. Because DMA-
county matches are not readily available for each year, we start with the Core Based Statistical 
Areas (CBSAs) as an approximate measure of the DMA, and then adjust based on 2012-13 
definitions of the DMAs. 
In order to compare the correct geographic area, we aggregate voter turnout and results 
by county (from Gomez et al. (2007)) and election results from Leip (2013) into the appropriate 
CBSA/media market. We focus on state-wide elections: Presidential, Senatorial, and 
Gubernatorial, in order to avoid the challenges associated with possibly gerrymandered House 
                                                 
3 This has a significant impact in our results. Grouping promoting and contrasting advertisements leads to significant 
results for positive ads and (often) insignificant results for negative ads. Keeping all three advertising categories 
generally does not lead to any significant results, although promoting and contrasting advertisements appear to have 
the same directional effect. 
districts. Appendix Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables while Appendix 
Table 2 provides correlations.4  
Models and Results 
To test our hypothesis that more positive ads will increase the margin of victory while 
negative “attack” ads directed at a candidate will decrease her margin of victory we estimate the 
following equation:  
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑒𝑚𝐴𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑝𝐴𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
The dependent variable is the Democratic margin of victory (which is, of course, negative 
if the Republican candidate wins in that market).5 Using the natural logarithm of Democratic and 
Republican ads allows a more straightforward interpretation of the coefficient β1 as measuring 
the percentage point change in the Democratic margin of victory in market i for office j in year t 
due to a one percent increase in Democratic ads. Similarly, β2, measures the percentage point 
change in the Democratic margin of victory in market i for office j in year t due to a one percent 
increase in Republican ads. The ads are also allowed to vary by type k. The main hypothesis is 
that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. The fixed-effects regression allows the constant, α, to vary by market, 
office, and year. We also control for incumbency effects, the lagged Democratic margin of 
victory, and a set of Market-Year demographic controls, X. 
                                                 
4 The data includes a low of 75 media markets (DMAs) for the 1996 Presidential election up to a high of 193 DMAs 
for the 2008 Presidential election. In terms of votes, these markets accounted for 40% of total votes cast in 1996 up 
to 48% in 2008. Because these are the largest media markets in the country, they tend to be more urban and more 
Democratic than the average voter. For example, in 2008 while President Obama won 52.9% of the popular vote, he 
won 54.7% in the largest 193 DMAs that make up the sample for that year. 
5 We also ran the model with a Democratic win dummy variable as the dependent variable. The sign and 
significance of those results were nearly identical to the results presented here. 
Column (i) of Table 1 gives the results when we look only at the (log) total number of 
ads. The results suggest that Democratic ads are slightly more effective. A one percent increase 
in total Democratic ads leads to a 0.02 percentage point increase in the Democratic margin of 
victory. On the other hand, a one percent increase in total Republican ads leads to a -0.015 
percentage point decrease in the Democratic margin of victory. Column (iii) breaks out the ads 
by whether they were positive or negative. The positive ads were clearly much more effective in 
total. A one percent increase in positive ads changed the margin of victory by 0.034 and 0.020 
percentage points for Democrats and Republicans, respectively. The coefficients on the negative 
attack ads are smaller and insignificant with the opposite sign than expected (negative for 
Democrats and positive for Republicans).  
[Table 1 Here] 
While we expected to find that campaigns that advertised more than their opponent were 
effective, that assumption also implies that candidates will attempt to match their opponents’ 
advertising. In this case, advertising from the two candidates cancels out, much like an arms 
race. One way to test this hypothesis is to separate media markets by their level of 
competitiveness. We create a variable that is equal to 1 when the margin of victory within the 
DMA is less than 10 percentage points and equal to zero when it is more. Column (ii) looks at 
the interaction effect of advertising with this variable and shows that the effectiveness of 
advertising is driven by noncompetitive media markets. We have modeled these results for ease 
of interpretation in Figure 1. In competitive areas, the effect of more advertisements is almost 
completely canceled out. In noncompetitive areas (graphs 1(a) and 1(c)), we see the expected 
upward slope of Democratic campaign advertisements and the negative slope of Republican ads. 
However, in competitive areas (graphs 1(b) and 1(d)), the lines are much flatter, and not 
statistically different from zero. The Republican line, 1(d), even slopes up, indicating that when 
Republicans advertise more in competitive DMAs they lose votes.  
[Figure 1 Here] 
Column (iv) repeats the same exercise, but breaks out advertising by type (negative and 
positive). We see the same general pattern in column (iv) as in column (iii) with positive ads 
much more effective than negative ads. These positive ads are not nearly as effective in close 
elections; the coefficient for the interaction term switches signs. Negative ads do not seem to be 
effective at all in increasing the margin of victory, either in competitive or noncompetitive 
elections.  
The results from Table 1 and Figure 1 indicate that positive ads are effective at increasing 
a candidate’s margin of victory but seemingly only in noncompetitive areas. One of our 
hypotheses (H3) is that ads from each candidate will tend to cancel each other out (e.g. running 
100 ads when your opponent runs 10 is effective but running 100 ads when your opponent also 
runs 100 is not). This implies that a potentially useful independent variable is not the absolute 
number of advertisements aired by each campaign, but the relative scale. In order to further test 
this hypothesis we create a scale variable for office i in market j in year t: 
𝐴𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝐴𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝐴𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
 
This variable will range from -1, when the Republican candidate does all of the 
advertising, to 1 when the Democrat is the only candidate advertising. If the two candidates 
advertise in equal amounts our scale variable is equal to zero. We can do this for total ads and 
break out the advertisements by tone. The regressions from Table 1 are repeated in Table 2 with 
the number of advertisements replaced by the scale variable. Because the dependent variable is 
the Democratic margin of victory and because our scale variable increases as Democrats 
advertise more, we would expect a positive coefficient on all scale variables. 
[Table 2 Here] 
The results from Table 2 imply that a candidate that can advertise 10% more than her 
opponent can expect to increase her margin of victory by 0.43 percentage points. If she can run 
two ads for every one run by her opponent, she can expect to increase her margin of victory by 3 
percentage points. The coefficient on positive ads is similar to that of total ads, but the 
coefficient on negative attack ads is negative, implying that running more negative ads than your 
opponent is associated with a lower margin of victory6, indicating that if a candidate has the 
funds to run twice as many ads as her opponents, it is critical for the candidate to run positive 
ads. If she attacks her opponent, her spending may cost her votes. One important result to note is 
that out advertising is only significant in noncompetitive areas. Out-advertising the opponent, 
through positive or negative advertisements, is ineffective in competitive areas. However, if a 
candidate can air many more ads than her opponent in an area in which she is winning (or losing) 
by a large margin, she can potentially increase her vote share significantly.   
                                                 
6 There is the possibility that there are significant differences between Presidential, Senatorial, and Gubernatorial 
elections. We run the regressions separately for each office and report the results in Appendix Table 3. Because of 
the smaller number of observations, it is less likely we will find significant results. We find no significant effect of 
advertising in Presidential elections, significant results in Senatorial elections (matching Table 2), and coefficients 
that have the same sign (but smaller magnitude) for Gubernatorial elections, although not statistically significant. 
Figure 2 models the results in Table 2 with the Ad Scale as the horizontal axis. Both the 
total adscale, 2(a) and positive adscale, 2(c), slope up significantly in noncompetitive DMAs but 
are not significant in competitive DMAs (graphs 2(b) and 2(d)). They also cross the horizontal 
axis very close to zero, implying that campaigns that advertise evenly have little to no effect on 
the margin of victory in that area. Negative ads in both noncompetitive DMAs, 2(e), and 
competitive DMAs, 2(f), are not significantly different than zero and have a downward slope. 
[Figure 2 Here] 
Another potentially important measure of proportionality is the balance between negative 
and positive ads (as opposed to the proportion of the Democratic candidate vs. the Republican 
candidate that we already captured). This is the proportionality tested by Stevens (2009). In order 
to test this, we construct a scale variable for each candidate in each DMA that is equal to: 
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡
 
This variable ranges from -1 (all ads are negative) to 1 (all ads are positive). The variable 
is equal to 0 if there is an equal amount of positive and negative ads. We repeat the regressions 
from Table 2 with this measure (“tone scale”) as our main explanatory variable. The results 
presented in Table 3 show that tone appears to matter more for Republican candidates than for 
Democratic candidates. The coefficient for Republicans is more than twice as large (5.6 vs. 2.6) 
and the p-value is also much smaller. This implies that there is a larger benefit to Republicans for 
staying positive and avoiding negative ads. 
Figure 3 shows that while we have the expected slope for both parties’ candidates (more 
positive advertising leads to a larger margin of victory), it is especially important for Republican 
candidates to be positive and avoid negative advertising. A focus on negative advertising by 
Republican candidates, especially in noncompetitive DMAs, significantly increases the 
Democratic candidate’s margin of victory. These results indicate that in noncompetitive areas 
(figure 3(a) for Democrats and 3(c) for Republicans), candidates who focus on positive 
advertising and steer completely clear of attacking their opponent can increase their margin of 
victory. The effects in competitive DMAs (figure 3(b) for Democrats and 3(d) for Republicans) 
have the correct slope but are not statistically significant.  
Our results this far cast doubt on why candidates would ever run negative advertisements. 
They do not appear to be effective and they even seem to have the opposite effect than the 
campaign intends. So far we have only investigated if the tone of ads affects the margin of 
victory for candidates. However, because candidates can increase their likelihood of winning via 
increasing turnout of their supporters or decreasing turnout among the opposition’s supporters, 
we investigate if the tone of ads will affect voter turnout.  
We hypothesized that negative ads will mainly be effective by reducing the turnout of 
those who would otherwise vote for the opponent. Because voter turnout is not available by 
party, in order to estimate this variable we calculate the percentage change in party vote in the 
DMA compared to the previous election. To control for population growth and overall change in 
turnout, we use the percent change in the Democratic vote as the dependent variable and the 
percent change in Republican vote as a control variable.  
%𝛥𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑑𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽2%𝛥𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐷𝑒𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Our hypothesis is that 𝛽1 will be positive for both the positive ad scale (Democratic 
turnout increases as Democrats advertise more than Republicans) and negative ad scale 
(Democratic turnout decreases as Republicans advertise more than Democrats). Table 4 gives 
results for the effect of relative campaign advertising on the change in Democratic vote totals 
using the same advertising scale variable as in Table 2. Column (i) shows that advertising 50 
percent more than your opponent will increase your turnout by 0.85 points, controlling for the 
change in your opponent’s (and overall) turnout. Column (iii) breaks out advertisements by type, 
and we can see once again that it is only positive advertisements that are effective in driving 
turnout. Attack ads have the opposite effect, reducing turnout for the candidate who is more 
negative. 
[Table 4 Here] 
Columns (ii) and (iv), graphed in Figure 4, look at competitive vs. noncompetitive 
elections. Here, we can see why candidates will advertise in close elections even though from 
Tables 1 and 2 it looked like this advertising was ineffective. Consistent with the literature on 
competitive elections and turnout (e.g. Fraga and Hersh 2010), competitive elections seem to 
drive turnout independent of advertising (the coefficient on the competitive dummy variable is 
4.1). With this additional turnout, advertising is less effective in competitive DMAs than in 
noncompetitive ones, but the sum of the coefficient on the advertising scale variable and the 
interaction term is still positive although not statistically significant. Effects on turnout for total 
advertising are graphed in Figure 4(a) for noncompetitive DMAs and Figure 4(b) for competitive 
DMAs. 
Column (iv) makes it clear that it is positive advertising that drives turnout. The sum of 
the positive advertising scale variable and the interaction term with competitive elections is 
positive and significant. The coefficient on negative advertising and the interaction term are both 
negative (with the F-test showing the sum to be significant), suggesting that negative advertising 
reduces your party’s turnout in both competitive and noncompetitive DMAs.  The effect of 
positive advertising is graphed in Figure 4(c) for noncompetitive DMAs and 4(d) for competitive 
DMAs while the effect of negative advertising is graphed in Figure 4(e) for competitive DMAs 
and 4(f) for competitive DMAs. 
Conclusion 
 We began this article by asking why candidates and consultants continue to “go negative” 
even if the literature indicates that negative advertising is not particularly efficacious. We 
suggest that the literature does not address the strategic environment of campaigns in which 
candidates have multiple decisions to make in the face of different campaign realities. Most 
importantly, we address several strategic calculations candidates must make. First, should 
campaign advertising be negative, positive, or a combination? Second, if the opposition goes on 
the attack, how should the campaign respond? Third, to the extent to which the campaign has 
pockets of strength, pockets of weakness and pockets in which they are running neck and neck 
with the competition, to what extent should resources be devoted to competitive areas over the 
areas in which they are guaranteed to either win or lose by a large margin? And fourth, to what 
extent is it efficient to spend money advertising more than your opponent, and are there 
repercussions to advertising less? 
 In regard to the first two questions, our findings indicate that the only beneficial results 
from campaign advertising generate from advertising a candidate’s strengths and that there are 
no benefits from attacking one’s opponent, even if the opponent has decided to “go on the 
attack.” To this end, the extent that candidates wish to use advertising to increase their margin of 
victory, the only way to do so is to avoid attacking one’s opponent.  
 In regard to the third question, our results indicate that candidates have good reason to 
expend resources in areas in which they are either losing or winning by a large margin. It is these 
places in which, if they stay positive, they are most likely to increase the number of voters who 
show up and vote for them.  Senate candidates in particular regularly focus on areas in which 
they are competing for votes. On average, senate candidates advertised 50 percent more in 
competitive areas than in noncompetitive areas, gubernatorial candidates advertised about 10 
percent less in noncompetitive areas, and presidential candidates aired about a third more ads in 
competitive areas than they did in uncompetitive areas. While for presidential contenders this 
may make sense given the importance of the Electoral College, our results suggest that for 
statewide candidates, this is a poor decision as the greatest impact of advertising is witnessed in 
noncompetitive DMAs. 
 Finally, in regard to our last question our results suggest that campaign advertising is like 
an arms race. If both campaigns are able to advertise equally in a given market, these 
advertisements cancel out and have no effect. But as in an arms race, neither candidate can 
unilaterally disarm nor stop advertising, as her opponent will be able to take advantage and win 
that area. But to the extent to which strategic candidates can seize the opportunity to out-
advertise their opponent while staying positive, our results suggest this is a smart decision.    
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Table 1: Effects of Advertisements on the Democratic Margin of Victory 
 
Margin of Victory  All  
Competitive 
DMA 
Interaction  All  
Competitive 
DMA 
Interaction  
Variable  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  
Log(TotalDemAds) 2.019*** 2.609***   
 (0.533) (0.667)   
Log(TotalDemAds) * 
Competitive DMA  -1.701*   
  (0.864)   
Log(TotalRepAds) -1.543*** -2.456***   
 (0.532) (0.724)   
Log(TotalRepAds) * 
Competitive DMA  2.831***   
  (0.912)   
Log(PosDemAds)   3.355** 4.425** 
   (1.339) (1.732) 
Log(PosDemAds) * 
Competitive DMA    -2.558 
    (2.257) 
Log(NegDemAds)   -0.612 -0.789 
   (1.311) (1.709) 
Log(NegDemAds) * 
Competitive DMA    0.513 
    (2.523) 
Log(PosRepAds)   -2.042* -2.979** 
   (1.224) (1.409) 
Log(PosRepAds) * 
Competitive DMA    1.918 
    (1.164) 
Log(NegRepAds)   0.893 1.075 
   (0.968) (1.286) 
Log(NegRepAds) * 
Competitive DMA    -0.219 
    (1.939) 
DemMarg(lag) 0.738*** 0.713*** 0.605*** 0.609*** 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.151) (0.143) 
Democratic Incumbent 10.33*** 9.615*** 6.280*** 5.917** 
 (2.263) (2.266) (2.249) (2.321) 
Republican Incumbent -8.035*** -8.250*** -6.839*** -6.932*** 
 (1.384) (1.386) (1.440) (1.406) 
Log(Average Income) -13.48 -11.41 -34.28* -35.88 
 (17.18) (17.12) (20.33) (21.86) 
Share Population Black -2.046 -1.970 -0.924 -1.006 
 (1.578) (1.510) (1.999) (2.026) 
Share Population Hispanic 1.058 1.045 0.245 -0.00911 
 (0.794) (0.800) (0.836) (0.824) 
Share Population > 65 2.622 2.713 0.671 -0.251 
 (2.663) (2.602) (3.303) (3.472) 
Share Population < 15 5.747 5.831 10.05 9.769 
 (5.578) (5.529) (6.271) (6.450) 
Share Population College 0.200 0.345 0.429 0.280 
 (0.617) (0.584) (0.786) (0.801) 
Share Population Male 5.442 6.114 2.890 1.246 
 (6.973) (6.894) (7.785) (7.416) 
2000 Dummy 3.729 2.182 9.274 10.14 
 (4.869) (4.825) (7.328) (7.310) 
2002 Dummy 3.593 1.891 7.889 9.122 
 (5.975) (5.862) (8.003) (8.293) 
2004 Dummy 10.43 8.186 16.06 17.81* 
 (6.805) (6.687) (10.05) (10.35) 
2008 Dummy 18.11* 15.02 28.73** 31.55** 
 (9.509) (9.341) (12.91) (13.43) 
President Dummy -0.506 -0.522 -2.393 -2.289 
 (2.637) (2.616) (2.950) (2.859) 
Senate Dummy 1.192 0.935 -0.460 -0.168 
 (1.833) (1.809) (1.931) (1.861) 
Competitive DMA  -8.798*  2.347 
  (4.590)  (8.280) 
Constant -196.6 -251.1 117.1 230.8 
 (362.4) (355.7) (451.6) (464.1) 
N  713 713 506 506 
R2  0.819 0.825 0.844 0.846 
Robust standard errors clustered at the market level in parentheses.  
Competitive = 1 if margin of victory < 10 percentage points and = 0 otherwise.  
*: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01  
 
  
Table 2: Effects of Relative Levels of Advertisements on the Democratic Margin of Victory 
Margin of Victory  All  
Competitive DMA  
Interaction  
All  
Competitive 
DMA Interaction  
Variable  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  
Total Ads-Scale 9.007*** 11.20***   
 (1.187) (1.351)   
Total Ads-Scale * 
Competitive DMA  -8.766***   
  (2.013)   
Positive Ads-Scale   6.972*** 8.493*** 
   (1.455) (1.673) 
Positive Ads-Scale * 
Competitive DMA    -5.372** 
    (2.097) 
Negative Ads-Scale   -1.901* -1.782 
   (1.133) (1.377) 
Negative Ads-Scale * 
Competitive DMA    0.212 
    (2.153) 
Dem Marg(lag) 0.777*** 0.753*** 0.749*** 0.741*** 
 (0.122) (0.130) (0.121) (0.120) 
Democrat Incumbent 11.95*** 11.04*** 8.893*** 8.400*** 
 (2.117) (2.141) (2.186) (2.235) 
Republican Incumbent -9.120*** -8.890*** -8.685*** -8.681*** 
 (1.240) (1.203) (1.284) (1.232) 
Log(Average Income) 0.161 0.986 3.776 2.458 
 (14.96) (14.48) (17.72) (17.46) 
Share Population Black -0.0844 0.227 -0.774 -0.822 
 (1.475) (1.386) (1.234) (1.259) 
Share Population Hispanic -0.509 -0.533 1.159 1.015 
 (0.881) (0.887) (0.732) (0.705) 
Share Population > 65 0.353 0.679 4.162* 3.830* 
 (2.386) (2.273) (2.307) (2.248) 
Share Population < 15 10.68** 10.66** 9.166* 8.799* 
 (4.367) (4.335) (5.210) (5.143) 
Share Population College 0.666 0.721 0.367 0.412 
 (0.709) (0.664) (0.566) (0.569) 
Share Population Male -4.709 -4.881 3.589 3.497 
 (5.885) (5.801) (5.790) (5.578) 
2000 Dummy 4.715 3.863 2.318 1.974 
 (4.321) (4.207) (4.724) (4.588) 
2002 Dummy 3.782 2.312 0.835 0.640 
 (5.397) (5.270) (5.573) (5.477) 
2004 Dummy 10.91* 9.359 5.647 5.412 
 (6.155) (5.951) (6.516) (6.461) 
2008 Dummy 20.32** 18.22** 11.44 11.67 
 (8.599) (8.264) (9.366) (9.274) 
President Dummy -2.968 -3.063 -0.778 -0.630 
 (2.459) (2.438) (2.408) (2.379) 
Senate Dummy -0.371 -0.427 1.869 1.872 
 (1.805) (1.740) (1.461) (1.445) 
Competitive DMA  0.651  0.389 
  (1.384)  (1.478) 
Constant 138.6 131.5 -338.7 -312.7 
 (331.8) (320.6) (318.6) (313.7) 
     
N  927 927 686 686 
R2  0.813 0.818 0.829 0.831 
Robust standard errors clustered at the market level in parentheses.  
Competitive = 1 if margin of victory < 10 percentage points and = 0 otherwise. 
Scale ranges from -1 (all Republican ads) to 1 (all Democratic ads)  
*: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01  
Table 3: Effect of Proportional Tone on Democratic Margin of Victory 
 
 All Competitive 
Interaction 
VARIABLES (i) (ii) 
Ad Tone Scale Democrat 2.610* 3.103* 
 (1.408) (1.674) 
Dem Ad Tone Scale * Competitive DMA  -2.124 
  (2.816) 
Ad Tone Scale Republican -5.606*** -6.311*** 
 (1.626) (1.717) 
Rep Ad Tone Scale * Competitive DMA  2.603 
  (1.835) 
DemMarg(lag) 0.769*** 0.771*** 
 (0.125) (0.122) 
Democratic Incumbent 10.29*** 10.08*** 
 (2.132) (2.148) 
Republican Incumbent -10.07*** -10.13*** 
 (1.428) (1.414) 
Log(Average Income) -5.278 -6.275 
 (18.50) (17.89) 
Share Population Black -1.763 -1.968 
 (1.519) (1.466) 
Share Population Hispanic 1.288* 1.075 
 (0.767) (0.708) 
Share Population > 65 3.264 2.738 
 (2.552) (2.428) 
Share Population < 5 4.209 3.810 
 (5.300) (5.166) 
Share Population College -0.182 -0.213 
 (0.584) (0.576) 
Share Population Mail 3.696 2.974 
 (6.624) (6.384) 
2000 Dummy 7.542 7.525 
 (4.948) (4.890) 
2002 Dummy 7.290 7.711 
 (6.139) (6.071) 
2004 Dummy 13.77** 14.44** 
 (6.932) (6.903) 
2008 Dummy 21.15** 22.43** 
 (9.970) (9.846) 
President Dummy -0.587 -0.592 
 (2.551) (2.533) 
Senate Dummy 2.313 2.397 
 (1.711) (1.684) 
Competitive Dummy  -0.520 
  (2.078) 
Constant -191.3 -131.6 
 (358.0) (349.3) 
   
N  713 713 
R2  0.818 0.819 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
  
Table 4: Effect of Relative Advertising on Percent Change in Democratic Vote Totals 
 
 
All 
Competitive 
DMA 
Interaction  
All 
Competitive 
DMA 
Interaction  
VARIABLES (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  
     
TotalAdScale 4.230*** 5.284***   
 (1.139) (1.399)   
TotalAdScale * Competitive 
DMA 
 -4.649**   
  (1.966)   
PositiveAdScale   4.997*** 5.757*** 
   (1.327) (1.510) 
PositiveAdScale * Competitive 
DMA 
   -2.754 
(1.917) 
     
NegativeAdScale   -2.783*** -2.259** 
   (0.973) (1.120) 
NegativeAdScale * Competitive 
DMA 
   -1.954 
    (1.836) 
Turnout 1.963*** 1.943*** 1.741*** 1.734*** 
 (0.551) (0.543) (0.534) (0.533) 
Turnout (Lagged 1 period) -1.595*** -1.585*** -1.497*** -1.494*** 
 (0.517) (0.509) (0.534) (0.526) 
% Rep Vote Change -0.692*** -0.690*** -0.598*** -0.604*** 
 (0.0723) (0.0708) (0.0865) (0.0854) 
Democratic Incumbent 3.820* 3.797* 4.257* 4.087* 
 (2.091) (2.067) (2.533) (2.460) 
Republican Incumbent -3.540** -3.052** -3.930*** -3.534*** 
 (1.379) (1.339) (1.343) (1.335) 
Log(Average Income) 26.75 30.06 33.94 37.09* 
 (19.21) (18.67) (22.04) (22.02) 
Share Population Black 4.364** 4.525** 3.525 3.522 
 (2.185) (2.152) (2.260) (2.183) 
Share Population Hispanic 1.150 1.333 1.739 1.920 
 (1.814) (1.801) (1.632) (1.609) 
Share Population > 65 3.134 4.051 4.958 5.747* 
 (2.906) (2.919) (3.211) (3.153) 
Share Population < 5 23.45*** 23.80*** 23.37*** 23.47*** 
 (5.600) (5.508) (6.347) (6.225) 
Share Population College 1.559 1.520 1.151 1.215 
 (1.364) (1.312) (1.371) (1.336) 
Share Population Mail -11.83 -10.76 -7.519 -6.504 
 (7.442) (7.763) (8.500) (8.493) 
2000 Dummy 5.578 4.883 7.588 6.694 
 (4.704) (4.614) (5.373) (5.183) 
2002 Dummy -23.23* -25.01** -22.36* -24.44** 
 (12.51) (12.34) (11.39) (11.31) 
2004 Dummy 13.88 12.06 14.00 11.83 
 (8.800) (8.678) (9.425) (9.368) 
2008 Dummy -0.185 -2.937 0.974 -2.129 
 (13.75) (13.58) (14.00) (13.96) 
President Dummy 2.108 2.083 2.506 2.597 
 (1.981) (1.931) (1.973) (1.920) 
Senate Dummy -1.480 -1.246 0.941 0.899 
 (1.264) (1.233) (1.271) (1.273) 
Competitive DMA  4.119***  3.794*** 
  (1.160)  (1.284) 
Constant -0.786 -103.7 -290.3 -384.9 
 (378.7) (394.5) (442.5) (449.3) 
N  924 924 684 684 
R2  0.864 0.868 0.877 0.881 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at the market level in parentheses.  
Competitive = 1 if margin of victory < 10 percentage points and = 0 otherwise.  
*: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01  
F-tests for sum of coefficients and competitive interaction terms: 
(ii):  TotalScale + TotalScale*Competitive = 0 
 F(1,193) =    0.19 
             Prob > F =    0.6621 
(iv): PositiveScale + PositiveScale*Competitive = 0 
 F(1,173) =    2.98 
             Prob > F =    0.0860 
 NegativeScale + NegativeScale*Competitive = 0 (Note that sum is negative) 
 F(1,173) =    7.00 
             Prob > F =    0.0089 
  
 
  
Figure 1: Effects of Campaign Advertisements in Noncompetitive and Competitive DMAs 
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Figure 4: Effects of Relative Advertisements in Noncompetitive and Competitive DMAs on 
Voter Turnout 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 
Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics by Office and Market 
 Governor & Senator President Total 
Variable  Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. 
Dem. Marg. 
Victory  
-0.12 0.37 26.68 -0.04 -0.17 22.08 -0.08 -0.01 24.7 
Dem. Vote Change  5.5 6.21 33.91 13.25 12.2 13.74 8.99 10.58 27.05 
Rep. Vote Change  -3.79 -5.96 29.77 7.42 5.76 17.69 1.25 0.24 25.67 
Democratic Total 
Ads  
1,880 937 2,362 2636.8 1309.5 3,603.30 2,171.70 1051 2925.7 
- Dem. Positive Ads 1,395 689.5 1,793 1852.6 976.5 2,401.60 1,574.60 795 2,060.40 
* Dem. Promote 
Ads  
947 320.5 1,374 928.2 124.5 1,299.60 939.6 235.5 1,345.40 
* Dem. Contrast 
Ads  
448 179 668 924.4 540.5 1,178.80 632 261.5 928.9 
- Dem. Attack Ads 484 84 753 784.2 241 1,392.20 600.1 133.5 1,056.50 
Republican Total 
Ads  
1,657 878.5 2,060 1,871.50 691.5 2,400.30 1,739.40 842 2,199.10 
- Rep. Positive Ads 1,258 694.5 1,258 1,127.10 297 1,531.70 1,207.20 541.5 1,607.40 
* Rep. Promote 
Ads  
832 416 1,183 762.7 197.5 1,111.10 805.2 296 1,155.50 
* Rep. Contrast 
Ads  
426 236.5 732 364.4 28.5 505.1 402 108.5 654.4 
- Rep. Attack Ads 399 63 601 744.5 184 1,148.20 532.2 107 870.4 
Note: Total Ads = Positive Ads + Attack Ads.  
Positive Ads = Promote Ads + Contrast Ads  Summary stats by market. Includes Presidential  elections in 1996 (75 markets), 
2000 (68 markets), 2004 (92 markets), and 2008 (193 markets); Senate elections in 2000 (80 markets), 2002 (79 markets), 2004 
(107 markets), and 2008 (186 markets); and Gubernatorial elections in 2000 (23 markets), 2002 (123 markets), 2004 (42 
markets), and 2008 (42 markets).  
  
 Appendix Table 2: Correlations by Party and Advertisement Type by Market 
 
 Republican 
Total 
Republican 
Positive 
Republican 
Negative 
Democratic Total  0.82 0.69 0.79 
Democratic Positive  0.78 0.70 0.70 
Democratic Negative  0.74 0.56 0.82 
 
  
Appendix Table 3: Effects of Relative Levels of Advertisements on the Democratic Margin of 
Victory, By Office 
 President Senate Governor 
Margin of Victory (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
       
Positive Ads-Scale 0.663 0.151 16.69*** 20.33*** 0.855 3.008 
 (1.188) (1.153) (3.710) (3.662) (11.92) (13.51) 
Positive Ads-Scale * Competitive 
DMA 
 1.183  -13.81**  -19.69 
  (1.322)  (6.047)  (39.59) 
Negative Ads-Scale -0.207 -0.976 -1.138 -2.113 -1.522 -6.274 
 (0.783) (0.945) (2.516) (2.671) (9.043) (8.849) 
Negative Ads-Scale * Competitive 
DMA 
 2.135  -2.207  9.859 
  (1.797)  (5.643)  (11.24) 
Dem Marg(lag) 0.258** 0.275** 0.912*** 0.809*** 0.419 0.626 
 (0.110) (0.121) (0.146) (0.138) (0.740) (0.538) 
Democrat Incumbent -16.77* -16.00* 6.731 4.637 12.28 12.09 
 (9.771) (9.101) (5.568) (5.850) (8.770) (9.534) 
Republican Incumbent -15.39*** -15.02*** -0.726 -1.105 -11.54 -6.694 
 (3.425) (3.179) (5.195) (4.486) (17.42) (16.92) 
Log(Average Income) -16.21 -13.88 67.52 60.32 37.16 -4.153 
 (16.17) (15.27) (60.95) (69.28) (321.1) (301.1) 
Share Population Black -1.766* -2.032* -0.232 -1.043 -6.999 -12.46 
 (1.038) (1.193) (3.625) (4.925) (21.52) (22.52) 
Share Population Hispanic 0.198 0.248 -2.207 -2.177 -7.597 -5.753 
 (0.689) (0.671) (3.442) (3.405) (29.15) (28.76) 
Share Population > 65 -0.786 -0.644 9.126 8.021 -6.129 -2.334 
 (2.559) (2.538) (7.838) (7.463) (76.35) (73.56) 
Share Population < 15 4.357 4.202 6.921 8.084 9.698 3.844 
 (3.708) (3.602) (21.96) (24.01) (67.31) (61.99) 
Share Population College 0.0357 -0.0379 0.643 0.959 -5.852 -6.281 
 (0.614) (0.616) (1.806) (1.863) (11.67) (12.29) 
Share Population Male -16.53*** -16.54*** -11.27 -14.08 -20.03 -0.788 
 (6.034) (6.129) (20.31) (18.62) (101.0) (92.12) 
2000 Dummy -17.96*** -17.86***     
 (5.979) (5.743)     
2002 Dummy   -1.450 -2.818 11.62 17.77 
   (6.781) (7.081) (35.90) (33.26) 
2004 Dummy   2.242 1.697 12.90 18.46 
   (10.76) (11.76) (51.03) (53.14) 
2008 Dummy   -2.156 -1.391 34.22 46.35 
   (21.10) (23.59) (122.7) (123.8) 
Competitive DMA (Dummy = 1 if   0.433  2.954  7.827 
    margin of victory < 10%)  (1.318)  (3.522)  (10.98) 
Constant 987.5*** 967.0*** -297.1 -73.88 834.1 358.8 
 (359.5) (347.5) (971.9) (1,037) (6,043) (6,169) 
       
N 328 328 217 217 141 141 
R-squared 0.981 0.982 0.918 0.927 0.930 0.941 
Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
